I haven't read This Kind of War, though it is on my list, but I think this review at least misunderstands US goals in Korea. After mid-1951, the American position was that total victory wasn't worth the cost, because that would involve invading China, and that there really wasn't anything north of the 38th parallel worth spending lives on. So that just leaves holding the line until the other side gets tired and agrees to peace. That just took another two years and Stalin's death. To the extent that the US goal from mid-1951 was "hold what we have and get an armistice" we won. That's not a particularly exciting goal, and it did boil down effectively to status quo ante, but there are times when that's the thing you decided you want because all the alternatives are way too expensive.
More broadly, I'm somewhat bearish on the Chinese military. They haven't had a war in almost 50 years, and that's a long time not to get any reality injected. They also have an extremely weird command structure that seems almost designed to paralyze them in a shooting war.
But Taiwan is being deeply unserious about their own defense, and that really worries me.
1- The Chinese ground troops did remarkably well given the tech disparity, so even if the US was after total victory, absent resorting to nukes, it still would have been difficult. Particularly given the time granted to the Chinese to dig in.
2- My especial interest was the poor quality of the troops at the beginning of the war in the wake of the Doolittle Board report. (Though it's entirely fair to point out that I didn't even mention the name Doolittle.) Which does seem to have a potential to bear on upcoming conflicts.
I am also bearish on the Chinese military (i.e. if I was forced to bet). But I am also on the lookout for evidence against that opinion.
1. Oh, it plausibly would have been impossible without nukes, and it's hard to see how it happens without dragging the Russians into the war. I was more pointing out that the line ended up where it did not because of US inability to move further north but because the US decided it wasn't worth moving north. (Also probably because that makes armistice negotiations harder.)
2. Granted, but we have had the current system for a long time, and the troops have done fine in every conflict of the last 35 years, whatever strategic screwups may have happened. It's not near the top of my list of worries.
He focuses on fascism in particular, so the points may not apply completely to Communist China, but I think it's worth considering that any totalitarian state that thinks too highly of itself may not be as formidable as it appears. Not to say that we ourselves should get too cocky, but we shouldn't be too scared either.
acoup is good stuff, and he makes a lot of great points. I would only add a couple of things:
1- China seems to want Taiwan a lot more than we want to defend it. The morale/desire of the Taiwanese is a big wildcard, but if they were really committed you would expect the percent of GDP spent on the military to be higher.
2- Even if we win most war games end up with us losing a couple of aircraft carriers. That would be a big shock regardless of how anything else turns out. The last big shock we had was 9/11 and we all know the how crazy that made things for awhile.
I haven't read This Kind of War, though it is on my list, but I think this review at least misunderstands US goals in Korea. After mid-1951, the American position was that total victory wasn't worth the cost, because that would involve invading China, and that there really wasn't anything north of the 38th parallel worth spending lives on. So that just leaves holding the line until the other side gets tired and agrees to peace. That just took another two years and Stalin's death. To the extent that the US goal from mid-1951 was "hold what we have and get an armistice" we won. That's not a particularly exciting goal, and it did boil down effectively to status quo ante, but there are times when that's the thing you decided you want because all the alternatives are way too expensive.
More broadly, I'm somewhat bearish on the Chinese military. They haven't had a war in almost 50 years, and that's a long time not to get any reality injected. They also have an extremely weird command structure that seems almost designed to paralyze them in a shooting war.
But Taiwan is being deeply unserious about their own defense, and that really worries me.
Two points:
1- The Chinese ground troops did remarkably well given the tech disparity, so even if the US was after total victory, absent resorting to nukes, it still would have been difficult. Particularly given the time granted to the Chinese to dig in.
2- My especial interest was the poor quality of the troops at the beginning of the war in the wake of the Doolittle Board report. (Though it's entirely fair to point out that I didn't even mention the name Doolittle.) Which does seem to have a potential to bear on upcoming conflicts.
I am also bearish on the Chinese military (i.e. if I was forced to bet). But I am also on the lookout for evidence against that opinion.
1. Oh, it plausibly would have been impossible without nukes, and it's hard to see how it happens without dragging the Russians into the war. I was more pointing out that the line ended up where it did not because of US inability to move further north but because the US decided it wasn't worth moving north. (Also probably because that makes armistice negotiations harder.)
2. Granted, but we have had the current system for a long time, and the troops have done fine in every conflict of the last 35 years, whatever strategic screwups may have happened. It's not near the top of my list of worries.
Hope you have fun in Norway and Iceland! The question of how well-prepared and effective the Chinese military could be made me think of this blog post: https://acoup.blog/2024/02/23/fireside-friday-february-23-2024-on-the-military-failures-of-fascism/
He focuses on fascism in particular, so the points may not apply completely to Communist China, but I think it's worth considering that any totalitarian state that thinks too highly of itself may not be as formidable as it appears. Not to say that we ourselves should get too cocky, but we shouldn't be too scared either.
acoup is good stuff, and he makes a lot of great points. I would only add a couple of things:
1- China seems to want Taiwan a lot more than we want to defend it. The morale/desire of the Taiwanese is a big wildcard, but if they were really committed you would expect the percent of GDP spent on the military to be higher.
2- Even if we win most war games end up with us losing a couple of aircraft carriers. That would be a big shock regardless of how anything else turns out. The last big shock we had was 9/11 and we all know the how crazy that made things for awhile.
#1 takeaway fact: 80% were Chinese at one point.
#2 takeaway fact: Turks showed up to Fight.
Most helpful visualization of the Korean War battle lines I've seen:
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/RNS7eNQu_fA
Hope you take waaaaaaay too many photos/clips on the vacation. Gorgeous! (Extras easy to delete later.)