What Our Last War With China Can Teach Us About Our Next One

Korea, Taiwan, Technology, Fukuyama, Ukraine, and the undefinable impact of morale.

I.

People are worried about a lot of things at the moment, but one thing near the top of everyone’s list is a war between the US and China over the fate of Taiwan. What most people have forgotten is that the US already fought a war with China. It’s easy to overlook this previous conflict because we called it the Korean War (and initially it wasn’t even called a war). This is understandable given that it took place in Korea. As such, it’s forgivable to overlook the huge Chinese involvement. But for most of the war the Chinese were our primary opponents. (At its peak 80% of enemy troops were Chinese.)

Can we draw any lessons from our last war with China when considering the possible outcomes of a future war with the same adversary? There are certainly worse places to look for information.

The first thing we might look at is the outcome. How did we do? How did the war end? This part, at least, most people remember. It ended in a draw. After costing the lives of at least four million people (soldiers and civilians) the final truce line was very close to the original dividing line of the 38th parallel.

This fact should make us pause. The Korean War happened just five short years after the end of World War II, which the US emerged from with the greatest military the world had ever seen. China on the other hand had, even more recently, emerged from a brutal civil war (the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949). On top of the internal death and destruction, China was one of the poorest and least industrialized major nations in the world. And yet somehow, despite these huge disadvantages, they fought us to a draw.

One might conclude that if the Chinese “tied” the US when they were poor and ill-equipped, now that they’re rich and technologically advanced, they’re going to easily win the next confrontation. This is almost certainly an overly simplistic way of looking at things, that said I think there may nevertheless be the kernel of something worth worrying about in this comparison.

Those who think it’s misguided to compare a future conflict over Taiwan with the previous conflict in Korea, might offer all sorts of caveats for it ending in a draw. The US military was forbidden from attacking China itself. We didn’t unleash our full might. (In particular nuclear weapons, despite MacArthur’s argument that we should.) Our heart wasn’t in it to the same extent as it had been during WWII—the stakes weren’t existential. The terrain of North Korea, particularly in the east, is very mountainous, which defanged many of our technological advantages. The Chinese and North Koreans had Soviet help. I could continue, but those are the major points.

In spite of these caveats, I still think it’s worth digging deeper. One of the difficulties faced when making geopolitical decisions is the relative paucity of previous lessons from which to draw. Wars between great powers are rare, and each one looks different—with different adversaries, different weapons and different motivations. So when you encounter similarities in any dimension it’s worth examining them. Accordingly I think there might be some interesting points to be drawn out of the Korean War which may bear on a possible (inevitable?) conflict over Taiwan.

II.

Before we dive into the nitty gritty of Korea, it’s worth taking a higher level view of things. What determines national military prowess? Francis Fukuyama had an interesting answer to that question in his book The End of History and the Last Man. (See my discussion of the book here.) Fukuyama got a lot of grief for, supposedly, claiming that history had ended. This criticism was unfair, he was not claiming this; rather he asserted that there were no remaining systems that could credibly compete with liberal democracy. And rather than being triumphal he expressed doubts about liberal democracy’s ability to provide long term meaning (the “Last Man” part of the title).

As interesting as that is, we’re interested in his conclusions about war. You can’t credibly compete on the world stage, much less be the last system standing, if you are unable to win wars. It doesn’t matter how repressive, or how awful a system is, if it’s better at waging war it will eventually supplant the less repressive, kinder system. Fortunately for those of us who prefer liberal democracy to communism, it turned out both to be less repressive, and also better at waging war. But why?

In Fukuyama’s account of things, it comes down to technology. A society that promotes free and open inquiry will have better science and better science leads to better technology which leads to better weapons. Additionally, the accompanying free and open market can produce more of those weapons.

You might be wondering how this played out in Korea. The Chinese had very poor technology while the Americans had the best technology in the world. This didn’t mean it was a cakewalk for the Americans, but neither did it mean that technology was unimportant. The North Koreans very nearly won the war in the first few weeks as they rapidly overran all but a small corner of South Korea, forcing the UN forces to make a final stand at the Pusan Perimeter. They were only able to hold on thanks to the fact that they had total air superiority. This allowed them to disrupt supply lines, strafe enemy troops, and most importantly provide close air support during critical engagements.

(Even with this massive advantage, had the Chinese been part of the initial invasion the UN still would have lost. One assumes this has not gone unnoticed during their planning for a potential conflict over Taiwan.)

Once the perimeter was stabilized, technology and US naval dominance was used in a brilliant stroke of maneuver warfare: the Inchon Landing. Technology was used to insert a huge force behind the North Korean front line, mostly cutting their supply routes and completely disrupting the offensive. After this encirclement the North Korean army largely disintegrated.

This would have been the end of things if the Chinese hadn’t intervened. Until then the war could have been viewed as a Fukuyamian triumph of liberal democracy’s war fighting prowess. Not only did the Americans (technically the UN Forces) have more advanced weapons, but they had more of those weapons. These weapons had turned defeat into victory first at Pusan, and later at Inchon. But as we know the story didn’t end there. For a variety of reasons which seem obvious in hindsight, China did enter the war, causing it to grind on for more than two and a half years before ending in an unceremonious draw.

III.

What happens in a potential future conflict when our technology is much closer to being equal? What would Fukuyama say then?

One aspect that’s particularly interesting is the difference in manufacturing capacity. I’ve been including that under the broad heading of liberal democracy’s technological advantage. But perhaps this advantage is not unique to liberal democracy, as it appears we have lost that advantage. I’m not sure whether it’s more accurate to round this to a tie or more accurate to say that the Chinese have a slight edge. But, in a long, attritional war, particularly one that’s close to China (e.g. Taiwan) we would have a difficult, though not impossible, time matching them.

Beyond the concrete concerns of materiel, there are a few areas of comparison that are less tangible.

One very important consideration is the aspect of readiness. The US has more recent experience with actual combat. On the other hand this combat has not been particularly taxing. Also to the extent that the US Navy trains and prepares, that preparation has to encompass situations and responsibilities from all over the globe. China only has one focus, and they pursue it with a single-minded determination.

Into this mix we need to throw various wildcards. Do the lessons of the Ukrainian war bear on the situation in Taiwan? If so, who is going to prove better at adopting and adapting these tactics? Another consideration: the Chinese military is almost entirely unproven, will they underperform like the Russians or will they be all the stronger having learned from Russia’s mistakes? Beyond that, there are all manner of little factors: luck, planning, new technology, old technology. To pluck one example out of many which could be used. China has placed great hopes in large anti-ship missiles which they hope will be able to take out US carriers. And on the other side the US is confident that they will be able to stop such missiles. A lot will depend on who ends up being correct.

Finally there’s the issue of morale and national will. Xi Jinping has made the forcible unification with Taiwan the centerpiece of his “reign”. He would suffer unrecoverable loss of face were he to fail. On the other hand, it’s not even certain that Trump is going involve the US in the defense of Taiwan when the time comes.. (ChatGPT gives a 60-70% chance that he delays or declines to assist.)

That’s the situation at the highest level, what about when we consider the average soldier? This is where examining the last time we fought China gets particularly interesting.

IV.

I recently finished reading the book This Kind of War by T. R. Fehrenbach. As you might have guessed, it's a history of the Korean War. Fehrenbach is pretty scathing when describing the American military and its soldiers at the beginning of the war. He contends that the mass conscription of WWII, and the training difficulties it entailed, resulted in a lot of bad leaders. In response to complaints about these leaders the Army over-reacted and ended up treating new recruits with kid gloves:

Now an N.C.O. greeted new arrivals with a smile. Where once he would have told them they made him sick to his stomach, didn’t look tough enough to make a go of his outfit, he now led them meekly to his company commander. And this clean-cut young man, who once would have sat remote at the right hand of God in his orderly room, issuing orders that crackled like thunder, now smiled too. “Welcome aboard, gentlemen. I am your company commander; I’m here to help you. I’ll try to make your stay both pleasant and profitable.”

This was all very democratic and pleasant—but it is the nature of young men to get away with anything they can, and soon these young men found they could get away with plenty.

A soldier could tell a sergeant to blow it. In the old Army he might have been bashed, and found immediately what the rules were going to be. [Now] the most likely outcome was for the man to be chided for being rude, and requested to do better in the future.

As a result of this, the American army seriously underperformed at the beginning of the war. But even after they improved Fehrenbach contends that the never reached the toughness of their Chinese enemies or even some of their UN allies.

For an example, consider the Turks. Fehrenbach was particularly impressed by the Turkish contingent, and he made some startling claims about the differences between their soldiers and the Americans. First he discussed how the Turks fought:

Tall, pale-eyed men with dark faces, in heavy greatcoats, wielding long bayonets, the Turks refused to fall back. There were observers who said some officers threw their hats to the ground, marking a spot beyond which they would not retreat, and, surrounded by the enemy, died “upon their fur.” There were others, all else failing, who threw cold steel at the enemy in bayonet charges. Rarely has a small action, dimly seen, sketchily reported, sent such intimations of glory flashing across the world.

Then he described the difference between Turkish and American culture with respect to those that had perished:

It was deeply ironic later, when the American Government, badly concerned with Turkish public opinion concerning their losses, sent quiet apologies to Turkish authorities. The Turks hardly knew what the Americans were talking about. The Turks, however badly used, had come to fight, and above all else Turks were proud of what their men had done.

And finally he describes how the Americans and Turks dealt with being POWs in a camp they called “Death Valley”:

The prisoners remained in Death Valley from the day after Christmas until 12 March 1951, and each day men died. They died of war wounds, of infection, pneumonia, dysentery. In most cases malnutrition was a contributing factor.

Each day Shadish and other doctors went to the filthy, crowded, lice-ridden, fecal-smelling huts, taking the sickest to the hospital.

Each night Sergeant Schlichter reported to the Chinese commandant the number who had died. There were some Turks and ROK’s with the Americans. To Schlichter’s knowledge, not one Turk had died.

Perhaps Fehrenbach makes too much of this difference. Perhaps in the time between the war and his book the stories have become exaggerated.

Perhaps Fehrenbach is too critical of the Americans, and too easy on the Turks. Despite all of this, troop morale, training, and even bravery is important. Presumably Americans will not be required to die “upon their fur”, but if they were could they?

Could the Taiwanese?

Could the Chinese?

V.

When considering a potential future conflict over Taiwan, we appear to be “tied” on a number of fronts. To this we must add the sobering fact that the last time we fought the Chinese, we were not tied on any of these fronts. We had vast advantages, and yet the outcome was a “tie” all the same.

In light of this previous outcome it should worry us that we no longer possess these advantages. It should worry us that we seem close to being even along most of the dimensions which matter. Should conflict arise what will break the “tie”?

Might it not come down to national will and the quality of the soldiers? We’ve already considered the difference in national will. What about differences among the actual rank and file? This is one of the great unknowns, and frequently pre-conflict predictions turn out to be either wildly optimistic or wildly pessimistic.

To consider one recent example the Ukrainians were supposed to quickly collapse in 2022, but instead they rose to the challenge. Many then assumed that Putin would have trouble continuing what was initially a limited invasion, but prisoner recruitment and other mobilization strategies have allowed them to grind on day after day. Will Taiwan be as resilient as Ukraine? Will China be as implacable as Russia?

Based on Fehrenbach’s assessment, the Chinese possessed both implacability and toughness in Korea. One imagines that they did it solely out of fear, but Fehrenbach claims otherwise:

Under continuous indoctrination, CCF soldiers fought more from pride and belief in their cause, and less from fear of their leaders.

Obviously “continuous indoctrination” played a big part, but also I don’t think that’s changed very much. How much “pride and belief in their cause” will they possess this time around? Enough to prove decisive? To break a “tie”?

The modern Chinese military is a long way from the peasant army that was sent into Korea, and the US military is a long way from the pampered soldiery present during the early days of that conflict. Despite this I believe it’s safe to say the US military still does more pampering than it should, and there’s more toughness in China than we want to admit.

We will continue speculating over and worrying about these differences until that potentially fateful day when we will at last know for certain what matters and what didn’t.

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I’m going to be gone on a trip to Norway and Iceland for the next couple of weeks. Despite this I’m hoping to get some book reviews out, but I make no promises. If you somehow, in this day and age, don’t have enough to read you can check out my archives.